Spain
Multiple-governance and integration policies in diverse socio-demographic contexts

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Introduction
This chapter maps out the main structural and policy frameworks which govern the integration of immigrants in Spain. It offers a clear example of a practical approach and of ‘multiple diversity’, in which two frameworks interact. The first of these is an old, unresolved framework, arising from democratic transition and based on Kymlicka’s (1995) term ‘plurinational’. The second is a new framework due to immigration and described as ‘polyethnic’. Spain is also situated at the geographical border of Europe, allowing important flows of migrants from the south keen to enter the Schengen space. The multilevel governance of integration influences the distribution of competence; the fact that multiple integration policy approaches can coexist, with their own intergovernmental tensions, makes Spain an exceptional *rara avis*. In this sense, the country has become a laboratory for integration in complex institutional settings (Zapata-Barrero 2010). Understanding how these flows have shaped Spanish society and how the different levels of administration have incorporated this phenomenon into their governance agenda is key to understand contemporary Spain (Zapata-Barrero 2012b).

The aim in this chapter is to identify the main drivers that may help us to understand these social and structural transformations in Spanish society over the last 30 years. The first part concentrates on reviewing flows and stocks in order to provide a clear overview of who the migrant population in Spain are and how they become part of Spanish society. The policies related to migrant flows – as part of border control – are under the ordinance of central government; however, integration policies are under different levels of administration, mainly local (autonomous communities or municipalities). The second part analyses how public administration has developed a set of instruments and actions to deal with these migratory dynamics. Our focus is on integration and inclusion policies from a multilevel perspective. Apart from examining the instruments promoted by central government, we examine the role of Catalonia, the first autonomous community to develop integration tools – and at the local level – even a year before the central government did in 1993.
The overall purpose of this chapter is to emphasise the paradigmatic case of Spain as a multilevel scenario in which integration policies have also been introduced in diverse socio-demographic contexts.

The demographic factor

The extraordinary intensity of international immigration in Spain throughout the twenty-first century and its no-less-spectacular decline during the economic crisis are perhaps among the best examples of the complex relationship between a demographic phenomenon, the economic context and legislation. In order to assess this interaction, we keep three elements in mind:

- the evolution of flows;
- the characteristics of the immigrant population and its integration into the labour force; and
- spatial distribution.

Demographic flows: from boom to bust

Between 1996 and 2017, 10 million arrivals from other countries were registered in Spain, the high point being in 2007, with a figure of 958,000, after which the numbers dropped to a little over half that estimate (64 per cent) in 2013 owing to the economic crisis. After this, they slowly started to rise again to reach 637,000 arrivals in 2017 – similar to the level recorded for 2004 (Cebolla-Boado and Pinyol-Jiménez 2019). Indeed, in the twenty-first century, until the onset of the economic crisis, Spain was one of the countries which received the most immigrants from abroad, second only to the United States (Widmaier and Dumont 2011). What caused this migratory boom? Several reasons come together in the explanation: economic factors (a flourishing economy with a labour market based on unskilled workers), demographic influences (a notable rise in levels of educational attainment, especially in generations of women, as well as a remarkable increase in life expectancy) and political dynamics (weakness of the welfare state and hence an absence of measures for reconciling family and working life, thereby inducing a large-scale externalisation of reproductive work in the market – particularly domestic tasks and care of children and the aged).

Observing how this situation developed, it is not difficult to see how, first, legal measures and, second, economic evolution have marked patterns of growth and decline. Among the former, some initiatives stand out, especially the impact of the extraordinary regularisation measures of 2000, 2001 and 2005. Announcement of these measures not only brought to light workers who were already living in the country and who now registered as if they had only just arrived but also, in some cases, resulted in the much-maligned ‘pull factor’. Nevertheless, there are other noteworthy measures, outstanding amongst which is the Schengen Visa. The anticipated announcement of a demand for visas from Ecuador in 2001, Colombia in 2003 and Bolivia in 2007, not only ended up with a downturn in migratory
flows but also had two striking results: the flows were moved forward during the year in question and there was a change in structure by sex and age thereafter as a consequence of family reunification. A third legal factor with major – although less evident – repercussions in the evolution of international immigration in Spain is the advantageous policy giving priority in access to nationality to people coming from Latin America, with a requirement of just two years’ continuous legal residence compared with the 10-year period stipulated for immigrants from other origins (Domingo and Ortega-Rivera 2015). This policy partly explains why the migratory boom consisted of large numbers of people from Latin America, with over 3 million arrivals. The fact that this coincided with the pan-ethnic discourse of Spanish nationalism after the Partido Popular (PP – People’s Party) led by José Maria Aznar came to power and favoured an ethnically based replacement of Moroccan immigrants. One of the inadvertent results of this ‘selection by origin’ (Joppke 2005) has been the thwarting of hopes for upwards social mobility among Moroccan immigrants (Domingo 2018).

Fluctuating numbers of immigrants from European countries are mainly the result of EU enlargement. Hence landmarks were established with the first arrival of immigrants from Poland in 2004 and later, in 2007, from Romania and Bulgaria, as shown by the sharp rises in Figure 8.1.

As for the falling numbers of immigrants in relation to the economic crisis, observers tend to agree that the measures taken to facilitate the return of immigrants to their respective countries were ineffective (Cachón Rodriguez 2012). The vast majority of the 2.4 million returnees or re-migrants between 2008 and 2013, the peak years of the crisis, did so independently of the return programmes.

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**Figure 8.1** Arrivals in Spain from abroad showing nationality by general continental origins, 1996–2017

Source: Authors, based on Residence Variation Statistics, 1996–2017 (INE – Spanish National Statistical Institute)
Andreu Domingo et al. (ILO 2009). Note that, with all this background, policing pressures in the first few months after the Spanish government recognised the situation of crisis, combined with the rhetoric which came with austerity policies, were fuelling resentment among the Spanish population when immigrants were often presented not only as competitors for public services and in the job market but also as fraudsters. Measures like that adopted by the Spanish government in 2012 suppressing the right to free health care for undocumented immigrants – but not applied by governments in some autonomous regions like Catalonia or the Basque Country – or cuts in unemployment benefits (which were supported by the regional governments), using as an excuse the alleged fraud committed by unemployed foreign workers, fanned the flames of xenophobic discourse. A final interaction between the economic crisis and the legal system with regard to migratory flows took the form of increasing numbers of immigrants who applied for Spanish citizenship even while planning to emigrate, but now with the security that nationalisation offered for a possible return to Spain, mobility in or re-migration to the countries of the Schengen Area or moving to other EU countries.

The recovery of immigrant flows after 2014 mainly features people coming from Latin America and the EU. The composition of the group from Latin America, however, points to the importance of expulsion (i.e. a push factor) rather than pull factors. Countries with the greatest presence in these rising numbers of immigrants are Venezuela (owing to the serious political and economic crisis), Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala (with increasingly high levels of citizen insecurity and the progressive closure of the border with the United States), as well as older countries of origin like Argentina (due to the expulsion caused by the Macri government’s neoliberal policies). The forced nature of some of these migratory movements also explains the rising numbers of applicants for asylum in Spain among these immigrants.

**Employability of the immigrant population in Spain: dualisation**

Despite the predominance of immigrants from countries of Latin America, one of the characteristics of Spain’s immigrant population is its heterogeneity, even among those who have come from this continent. On 1 January 2018 the foreign-born population residing in Spain numbered 6.4 million or 13.7 per cent of the total population. The first ten places in Figure 8.2, showing immigrant origins, are occupied by countries from four continents, which are as different as Morocco (almost 826,000 people), Romania (around 593,000) and Ecuador (404,000). The differences among the groups between immigrants born in the counties of origins and those who are citizens thereof are very conspicuous due to the fact that preferential access to Spanish citizenship was given to immigrants from Latin America. Hence, if the difference between the number of people from Morocco and those with Moroccan citizenship is only 55,151 people, the figure for Ecuador rises to 269,139; the disparity is even more extreme in the cases of the Romanian or Chinese populations, among which those who keep their original nationality are more numerous than those actually born in those countries.
As suggested in the earlier discussion of the causes of the migratory boom, incorporation into the workplace of these groups of immigrants occurs in a dualised job market. If, at the beginning of this polarisation, during a time of economic growth, employment integration acted in a complementary way, similarly favouring the job prospects of young people and university-educated Spanish women – as happened elsewhere in other countries of the south of the EU (Domingo and Gil 2007) – it also accelerated market deregulation in such a way that, after the onset of the crisis, it exacerbated the differences between people of varying national origins. A second characteristic of this labour integration process was the feminisation of the workforce, spurred by the demand in the service sector owing to the externalisation of child care and domestic work, as mentioned earlier, and this was mainly met by female immigrants from Latin America.

In contrast to Spaniards, the foreign-born population is mostly concentrated in the secondary sector, in jobs with minimal educational requirements and low salaries. The specialisation into certain job niches brings about acute occupational segregation – not only vis-à-vis the autochthonous population but also among workers of different origins – together with marked over-qualification. This division of labour might be described as what some American authors call ‘segmented assimilation’ (Portes and Zhou 1993), although the original concept referred specifically to the so-called second generation and hence not so much to the immigrants themselves but to their descendants. Assimilation into the job market where the demand is mainly for unskilled labour – using large numbers of workers with a nonlegal status and hence engaged in undeclared work – helped to bring about a situation in which the progress made by immigrants is conditioned by earlier prejudices held by the Spanish population about people of different origins. What frequently occurs is assimilation by downward social mobility, and the economic
crisis only heightened the probability of this downward movement. Given that it is not long since the immigrants arrived, it is difficult to corroborate this trend for their descendants, although some school results give the impression that the inequality will be reproduced (Bayona and Domingo 2018).

The effects of the economic crisis deserve separate consideration (Figure 8.3). As we have noted, this affected flows, with a drastic drop in the numbers of arrivals and a concomitant rise in departures. However, as far as the population is concerned, there are three main consequences which need to be taken into account, as they have had a considerable impact on integration policies with regard to the available resources, especially at the local level, the illegal status of immigrants and unemployment, and, increasingly, household vulnerability. In the case of the first effect, one of the earliest austerity measures adopted after the economic recession had finally been recognised in May 2012 was the cutting of EU integration funding which the government had been distributing among the municipal coffers. Since local administration was the most directly involved in applying integration policies, the effects of the cut were even more adverse. This was due to the associated suspension of contracts, in particular among intercultural mediators who were working to avoid community conflicts, many of whom were of immigrant origin. Besides, when the real estate bubble burst, municipal debt rose because local administrators had seen speculation on this market as an easy way of boosting the budget. Just at the time when investment in integration policies was the most necessary because of the economic situation and also growing second generations, this investment either stopped or dropped to alarmingly low levels, depending on the policies and financial capacity of each municipality. The

*Figure 8.3* Evolution of unemployment by birthplace, Spain, 2004–2018

Source: Authors, using the Labour Force Survey, 2Q2018 (INE – Spanish National Statistical Institute)
Spanish government took advantage of the economic crisis to recentralise powers that had been devolved to the autonomous regions, which then led to new tensions between central and local administration at both regional and municipal levels. Immigration was one of the bones of contention.

Second, the crisis had a perverse, unforeseen effect on the system of continuous regularisation which, in force since 2006, was known as ‘El Arraigo’ or ‘social attachment’, a process consisting of the authorisation for foreigners in an irregular situation to live and work in Spain for a year (with the possibility of subsequent renewal in the form of a residence permit) – since it was linked with job offers. When the possibility of finding work was all but ruled out as an effect of the crisis, the individual (but generalised) transitory state of what had been an irregular situation during the boom years turned into an almost permanent structural element of the recession. This meant increasing numbers of people who were suddenly relegated to an irregular status because the loss of jobs for immigrants whose papers were in order could lead to the loss of the associated permit and hence to being condemned once more to an illegal status. Social and humanitarian Arraigo, entailing family links living on the municipality as well as a longer period of residence and close involvement with the community in question, then became the main way of achieving a legal status and, accordingly, was much more common than the earlier resort of joining the workforce (Sabater and Domingo 2012).

Third and finally, the impact on unemployment must also be taken into account. When the real estate bubble burst, the first sector to be hit by the crisis was the construction industry and its offshoots, a mostly male domain in which many foreign-born immigrants were employed. Meanwhile, a large percentage of women working in the service sector or as domestics were better able to resist the onslaught of the crisis, although they paid the price of having to accept precarious jobs or going back to work in the informal economy. Accordingly, unemployment levels rose more among men than among women who, on earlier occasions, were the first to be forced out of the labour market (Domingo and Sabater 2013 Hence, if, in 2007, male unemployment among foreign-born immigrants was estimated at 13.6 per cent (three points higher than the figure for Spanish workers), by 2013 it had grown to 35.3 per cent – which was well above the high figure of 24.3 per cent for Spanish-born workers (Figure 8.3). The effect among women who, before the crisis, were on record as being economically active (i.e. Latin American women) was very different to that among women who were not (mainly African). At a time when their male partners were losing their jobs, more and more women were registering as jobless, so their unemployment figures rose sharply in what has been called the ‘addition effect’. Consequently, at the worst moment, 40.7 per cent of Ecuadorian women were registered as unemployed, while the percentage of unemployed Moroccan women hit an all-time high of 61.6 per cent (Figure 8.3).

Unemployment levels began to fall after 2014 but not equally for all origins. Not only did they continue to show a considerable difference from the figures for the autochthonous population but, in some groups such as unemployed Moroccan men, although the figures improved – dropping from 49.4 per cent in 2013
to 30.4 in 2018, or 19 percentage points – they were still a long way from the figures for immigrants born in Ecuador, which went from 46.8 to 19 per cent, a drop of 27.8 percentage points, or for Romanians, whose levels of unemployment fell by 27.4 percentage points from 43.6 to 16.2 (Figure 8.3). When viewed from the standpoint of family vulnerability, these unemployment levels in populations like those of Moroccan origin (who, as we have noted, still constitute the largest group of foreign-born nationals resident in Spain today), estimated at 30.4 per cent for men and 48.3 for women in 2018, give rise to totally anomalous situations (Figure 8.3). Figure 8.4 gives an approximate illustration of the problem: in 18.3 per cent of homes in which at least one Moroccan-born person resides, all the economically active members of the household are unemployed.

**Spatial distribution: diversity and vulnerability**

The offers on the job and housing markets explain the spatial distribution of Spain’s immigrant population. One of the main characteristics of this distribution is its dispersal over the territory for the whole immigrant population, although some groups, based on national origins and type of employment, tend to be more concentrated than others in different parts of the country. By autonomous region (see Table 8.1), and in absolute numbers, Catalonia stands out, with more than 1.38 million newcomers, followed by Madrid with almost 1.22 million and a long way ahead of other regions like the Autonomous Community of Valencia, with 815,000 and Andalusia with 788,000. Relatively speaking, however, the Balearic Islands, with 22 per cent of the population consisting of immigrants stand out, together with Madrid with 18.5 per cent and Catalonia with 18.2 (Table 8.1). This spatial distribution means, first, a change in comparison with Spain’s internal migratory movements in the 1960s so that while, in Madrid and Catalonia,

![Figure 8.4](image-url)  
Figure 8.4 Percentage of households where all adults are unemployed, by large continental groups, Spain, 2018  
Source: Authors, using the Labour Force Survey, 2Q2018 (INE – Spanish National Statistical Institute)
Table 8.1 Total population and foreign-born population by autonomous region, Spain, 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Autonomous Region</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Foreign-Born</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Andalusia</td>
<td>8,384,408</td>
<td>788,101</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aragon</td>
<td>1,308,728</td>
<td>167,858</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asturias</td>
<td>1,028,244</td>
<td>75,465</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balearic Islands</td>
<td>1,128,908</td>
<td>250,794</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canary Islands</td>
<td>2,127,685</td>
<td>395,033</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cantabria</td>
<td>580,229</td>
<td>49,111</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castile and Leon</td>
<td>2,409,164</td>
<td>179,657</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castile-La Mancha</td>
<td>2,026,807</td>
<td>198,081</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catalonia</td>
<td>7,600,065</td>
<td>1,380,590</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomous Region of Valencia</td>
<td>4,963,703</td>
<td>815,551</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremadura</td>
<td>1,072,863</td>
<td>44,507</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galicia</td>
<td>2,701,743</td>
<td>221,963</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madrid</td>
<td>6,578,079</td>
<td>1,219,347</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murcia</td>
<td>1,478,509</td>
<td>226,621</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navarre</td>
<td>647,554</td>
<td>92,298</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basque Country</td>
<td>2,199,088</td>
<td>206,530</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Rioja</td>
<td>315,675</td>
<td>43,912</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceuta</td>
<td>85,144</td>
<td>11,046</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melilla</td>
<td>86,384</td>
<td>20,439</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spain</strong></td>
<td><strong>46,722,980</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,386,904</strong></td>
<td><strong>13.7</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors, Spanish Population Register, 2018 (National Institute of Statistics)

International migration has replaced earlier migrations from elsewhere in Spain, in the Basque Country this demographic history has been interrupted and, at the other end of the scale, Andalusia came to be a net exporter of workers in the twentieth century. This pattern will somehow become noticeable in attempts to make sense of the phenomenon – i.e. when justifying policies applied at the level of the autonomous regions. Consequently, while continuity prevails in regions which formerly received more immigrants – especially Catalonia, a land of immigrants – in the case of Andalusia, the situation of new immigrants will be compared with the migratory experience (especially in Europe) of generations of Andalusians who left their homeland in the 1960s. Moreover, the composition of immigrants by origin, sex and age will vary substantially in each autonomous region, thus presenting different challenges in the various integration projects.

At the municipal scale, in absolute numbers, the big cities unsurprisingly concentrate the greatest numbers of foreign-born immigrants. Heading this list are Madrid, with 679,000 foreign-born residents, Barcelona with 392,000 and Valencia with 135,000 according to the Spanish Population Register (INE 2018). In relative terms, however, the picture is very different: leaving aside very small towns, the largest concentrations are found in tourist towns throughout the territory and especially along the Mediterranean coast: Llíber in Alicante (where 68.9 per cent of the population is foreign-born), Benhavis in Malaga (64.1) and Adeje
in Santa Cruz de Tenerife (52.3) (INE 2018) are good examples of clusters mainly consisting of retired European immigrants and their compatriots who accompany them, or people – usually of British origin – attracted by the job possibilities they generate. In these towns of the Alicante region, Andalusia and the Canary Islands, one finds not only the highest percentages of such immigrants but also much more pronounced segregation in these so-called golden ghettos than that found in neighbourhoods of Spain’s big cities.

The institutional and structural framework

Immigration has never been a competence defined in the constitutional framework or in any other constitutional law delimiting governance and policy management. Instead, immigration emerged as an administrative and technical issue in the 1990s and as a political and social issue in 2000 (Arango 2000). Spain is developing its competence on immigration pragmatically, by taking the policy instruments in its administrative and policy structure and constructing its legal and regulatory instruments while respecting its already decentralised division (Zapata-Barrero 2012a).

At the beginning of the 2000s, immigration as a topic had entered the Spanish political and social agenda. This ‘politicization of immigration’ (Zapata-Barrero 2003) evidences how migration has become a factual certainty in a country with a traditional emigration history. This implied that the main concerns of the Spanish migration policy were resolved and that these concerns perhaps remain unchanged for the different Spanish governments and administrations (Cebolla-Boado and Pinyol-Jiménez 2014). Instruments to manage economic migration, collaboration with third countries (non-UE) and fighting irregular migration flows (mainly via maritime borders) have progressively become crucial topics into the Spanish labour market – have been acquiring relevance over the years, but in an ambivalent process in which different actions and instruments have been developed, although lacking a theoretical and shared framework about what integration means (Cebolla-Boado and González-Ferrer 2013).

From national administration to local authorities, integration has become a crucial and wide discussion in which the rights of the migrant population (including those in an irregular situation), the management of cultural and religious diversity, opportunities and anti-discrimination measures have been argued with different intensities. The absence of a structured model as in other European countries (Favell 1998) has been seen, nevertheless, as an opportunity to focus on maintaining social cohesion in a multiply diverse scenario (Zapata-Barrero 2013). Defining the boundaries of a public philosophy of integration means understanding narratives, instruments and actions developed to manage diversity and to guarantee social cohesion and conviviality (convivencia as living together) in a decentralised Spain (Ferrero-Turrión and Pinyol-Jiménez 2009). It has been argued that, in the absence of traditions, Spain has followed a practical philosophy (Zapata-Barrero 2012b) – i.e. a way of managing diversity which is based not on established and preconceived ideas, projected by its own social construction, such as
French republicanism or British multiculturalism but, rather, on questions and answers generated by the practice of diversity governance (Carrera 2005, 2006).

The Organic Law 4/2000 of 11 January 2000 on the rights and freedoms of foreign nationals in Spain and their social integration is the main legal migration framework in Spain. It regulates the rights, obligations and liberties of foreign citizens, including:

- the right to family reunification and legal guarantees;
- the conditions for entry into Spanish territory, authorisations to remain, temporary residence (including residence on the basis of family reunification, labour or social reasons, humanitarian reasons or other exceptional circumstances) and permanent residence;
- the specific regimes such as those of students, stateless persons, persons without identity documents, refugees and unaccompanied minors; and
- work permits and the annual quota of foreign workers.

In addition, this law regulates offences in the area of foreigners’ affairs, the regime of sanctions and coordination of public authorities, the performance of the Labour Inspectorate aimed at controlling working conditions and combating irregular employment and labour exploitation, and the support of public powers for immigrant associations, groups and organisations in support of immigration.

Competence in integration issues is complex in Spain. Integration is a cross-cutting topic affecting several areas in which different levels of administration (national, regional and local) participate but in which there is a lack of multilevel governance mechanisms for collaboration. While matters relating to nationality, immigration, foreign nationals and the right to asylum are exclusive to the state, integration policies (employment, education, housing, health, social services etc.) are mainly devolved to the autonomous communities (in some policies, with full responsibility for legislating and implementing but, in others, just for implementing). Almost all communities have, in recent years, implemented their own immigration and integration policies and plans. Moreover, the local authorities have a competence that affects integration policies; in fact, there are several municipalities which have their own local integration plan or a number of ongoing initiatives in this area. NGOs additionally play a role, providing services or collaborating with the different administrations (Morales et al. 2009).

Lastly, to understand integration policies in Spain, the exceptionality of the Spanish Municipal Population Register (padrón) should be noted. Each town council is in charge of the creation, management and maintenance of its population register, containing personal data regulated by the law. The system of continuous and computerised management of municipal population registers was introduced in 1996; starting in 1998, population figures have been obtained (up to the first of January each year) which are declared official by the Council of Ministers (at the end of the year). In Spain, residents are entitled to public services by being on the municipal population register. Registration, or empadronamiento, is mandatory for all residents (on a permanent or a temporary basis) in the municipality,
regardless of their legal status. On registering, all residents (nationals, immigrants and irregular migrants alike) receive a card that entitles them to full health coverage and access to education for their children. Even irregular immigrants who do not have a health card are treated in hospitals without being reported to the police. Political participation is also related to the padrón, as it is the register that provides data for the electoral census.

Due to its exceptionality in the European scenario, the padrón has been controversial, especially regarding irregular migrants. In 2003, for instance, a bill by the then-conservative majority in parliament authorised the police to use information contained in the municipal registers to detect ‘unauthorised’ immigrants; however, this was met with widespread protest and there is no evidence that the plan was ever implemented. Furthermore, a legal reform passed in 2000 extended welfare benefits – health and education and, occasionally, other social benefits such as a basic income for vulnerable families – to irregular migrants. In 2012, the government adopted a legislative decree amending the law so that the health card was correlated to legal residence and affiliation in the social security programme, thus limiting health care for irregular immigrants to minors below the age of 18, pregnant women or people in emergency situations. Several regional governments – such as those of Catalonia, Navarre, Andalusia and the Basque Country – in charge of health services, announced their refusal to comply, as did several medical associations. In 2015, the central government withdrew the decree and, in 2018, a new decree (Royal Legislative Decree 7/2018 of 27 July on universal access to the national health system) restoring universal access to health services was approved. In any case, this exceptional feature of the Spanish system was seldom questioned and has long been a widely accepted extension of registration to residents, including irregular migrants.

The rule of the padrón could explain why, in Spain, the national, regional and local authorities have all emphasised the residence criteria as crucial in talks about integration and social cohesion. Residence is beyond origin and legal status and is conceived as the sum of real residence with the purpose of permanent settlement. This criterion appears in almost all local and autonomous community integration programmes.

**Building a common approach to integration? The role of central administration**

Migrants’ integration was not a part of any normative and political framework until the mid-1990s. Until its accession to the European Community in 1986, Spain had neither an immigration policy nor an immigration law. In 1985, as a precondition for EC membership, the first Spanish immigration law was enacted: it was more a ‘requested’ law to meet EC standards than a real need (Pinyol-Jiménez 2007). The first law on Rights and Freedoms of Foreigners in Spain was passed in 1985 and was mainly focused on managing migration flows, while the first mention of migrant social integration in a parliamentary debate happened in 1991. It was in 1994 that the first Action Plan for Migrants’ Integration was
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approved. It aimed, among other objectives, to guarantee access to social services and benefits for the migrant population, to facilitate naturalisation processes for foreigners born in Spain and to acknowledge the role of native tongues for migrant children. In 2000, the Spanish Plan emphasised the importance of migrants’ integration, since which time the migratory law has been called ‘on the rights and freedoms of foreigners in Spain and their social integration’. Also, in 2000, the *Foro para la Integración Social de los Inmigrantes* (Forum for the Social Integration of Migrants) was created as a consultative organism – composed of persons belonging to local and autonomous administrations, representatives of central government and representatives of immigration associations – to canalise discussions and reflections on integration issues.

In 2004, the creation of the Secretariat of State for Immigration and Emigration under the Ministry of Labour, with a General Direction on Integration, established a new approach to this topic, as responsibility for migration policies moved from the Home Affairs Ministry to Labour Affairs. Furthermore, in 2007, the Spanish government approved the first Strategic Plan on Citizenship and Integration (*PECI-Plan Estratégico de Ciudadanía e Integración*) as a roadmap to guide public administrations in dealing with integration issues. The *PECI 2007–2010* was based on three main principles: equality and non-discrimination, citizenship and interculturality. The first equates the rights and obligations of the immigrant population to those of the autochthonous population within the framework of basic constitutional values; the second entails recognition of the full civic, social, economic, cultural and political participation of migrants and the latest aims to promote interaction between people of different origins or cultures, in a framework of respect for cultural diversity (Ferrero-Turrión and Pinyol-Jiménez 2009).

In parallel, the Support Fund for the Reception and Integration of Immigrants and their Educational Support was created in 2005. Its aim was to channel supplementary funding to regions and municipalities with rapidly growing populations to support their provision of services to native and foreign residents in areas such as health care and education. The fund, which allocated assistance to autonomous communities to finance integration initiatives led by local authorities (it reached a peak of 200 million euros in 2007 and 2008) was created by the social democratic government; it ended in 2012 under the centre-right government.

Up to the present day, the fund has never been reinstated, although social entities and subnational administrations have continuously requested its restoration. Certainly, the effects of the economic crisis and the cutting of funds were clear signs of the government’s priorities and main concerns as, during the former, all national financial support to regions and local authorities to deal with migrants’ integration was cut back, although resources were allocated to return programmes which never met expectations (Parella *et al.* 2014).

The first plan was followed by a second *PECI 2011–2014* which also emphasised the need to guarantee the full exercise of migrants’ civil, social, economic, political and cultural rights. The plans also sought to ensure access to public services for the migrant population, along with the adaptation of public policies, particularly in education, employment, social services, health and housing, in order
to meet the new needs of migrants in Spain and to combat discrimination and xenophobia. The PECI II was approved under the centre-left government but was poorly implemented under the centre-right, which did not replace it with a new plan after 2014.

In 2017, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) regretted that there lacked a national integration strategy in Spain after the end of PECI II in 2014 (ECRI 2018). At the same time, the ECRI Report (2018) pointed to the lack of data and indicators to evaluate the outcome of these integration plans. The absence of a coherent system of integration indicators made it very difficult to assess the migrants’ situation and to monitor the results and impacts of integration policies and instruments. Currently, the Spanish government is preparing a third PECI.

Both previous PECI have had little impact in the different administrations and in public debate. It is difficult, due to the lack of clear impact indicators, to know the extent to which these plans have reconfigured the actions of the central administration regarding migrants’ integration, how much and in what way this integration has occurred and to what extent the plans have permeated the different social organisations, beyond those that have been directly involved. If the new PECI aims to become a roadmap rather than a general orientation framework, it must of necessity include a coherent system of integration indicators in areas such as education, employment, health and housing, and must evaluate and improve the impact of integration policies and instruments on such areas.

The meso level: exploring the ‘Catalan’ way of integration

Catalonia was traditionally a region of immigration, with important flows, mainly from southern regions of Spain, occurring during the 1960s, leading Catalan social entities (and, later, politicians) to consider the question of integration well before the issue was tackled at the Spanish level (Zapata-Barrero 2009). Considering its own culture, language and history, narratives on self-government, competence and identity have been present in the public debate in Catalonia which also had an impact on discussions of migrants’ integration at the public and political levels (Franco-Guillén and Zapata-Barrero 2014). Civic residence was understood as a crucial part of Catalan society, regardless of nationality or place of birth. Different instruments promoted by the Catalan government have highlighted the important and positive contribution of migration to Catalonia and recognised its impact on the process of nation-building there.

The first Interdepartmental Plan on Immigration was approved by the Catalan government in 1993 to promote the integration of immigrants in Catalonia and to facilitate their personal and social development, according to a framework of rights and obligations. This plan was a pioneer initiative in Spain and part of a process in which autonomous communities were progressively acquiring skill in areas such as education, health and social services; as such, the role of regional and, especially, local authorities in the integration of immigrants became clear (Pinyol-Jiménez 2013).
In 2000, the Catalan government approved the second Interdepartmental Plan on Immigration, 2001–2004, managed by the newly created Secretariat for Immigration. The plan stated the importance of migration into Catalonia, and the role of positive ‘living together’ in strengthening social cohesion; it also recognised a Catalan identity based on a shared culture and language. Both elements configured the so-called Catalan way of integration, which tries to balance a respect for diversity with a sense of belonging to Catalan society and acquiring the Catalan language.

The 2005–2008 Plan on Citizenship and Immigration emphasised the citizenship concept by stating that residence was the only condition needed to be defined as a citizen and was thus the target of public policies. The plan was foreseen for all (resident) citizens without concern for their national origin, and integration was understood as a two-way process. The plan highlighted that the Catalan language and identity were the backbone of social cohesion, and that the latter had been enriched by newcomers, making all residents in Catalonia stronger, richer and of greater plurality.

Following this plan, in 2008 the Catalan government approved the National Agreement on Immigration (Pacte Nacional de la Immigració) – also known as an ‘agreement to live together’. As opposed to earlier plans, this one searched for political and social consensus: the consultation process involved more than 1,500 people and the agreement was endorsed by all but one political party in the Catalan parliament and by more than 70 associations from civil society. A renewed plan was approved for the 2009–2012 period and, in 2014, the new Citizenship and Migration Plan: Horizon 2016’ was ratified which focused on three main areas: immigration policies mainly focused on migrants’ accession to labour market, policies to encourage equal opportunities, and policies designed to foster integration and settlement in a common public culture. Currently, in 2019, the Catalan government is working on a new intercultural plan.

Note that, since the 2008 agreement, the Catalan government has emphasised the idea of a ‘common public culture’, an interesting premise to link migration policies with nation-building, as took place for other national minorities in other Western countries (Zapata-Barrero 2009). From the beginning, the governmental narrative in Catalonia highlighted the need for instruments and policies to unite diverse groups through a shared sense of national identity. This notion implies encouraging participation in public life, making Catalan the common public language, living together among a plurality of beliefs and ensuring equal opportunities between men and women and, finally, incorporating inter alia the gender perspective.7

To summarise the main trends of this policy process, the ‘Catalan way of integration’ understands diversity as a positive contribution to Catalan society, emphasises the Catalan language as a key element of social cohesion and a strategic instrument to ensure equal opportunities, promotes a ‘living together’ model based on residence to ensure equal rights and duties, pays attention to youth (education) to ensure social mobility and endorses a common public culture of integration. More recently, issues such as fighting discrimination and hate speech have
also become priorities. In 2019, before the general, local and European elections, all parties in the Catalan parliament and several social entities approved an agreement for living together and for avoiding the use of migration as a political tool in electoral campaigns. Parties have committed to defending democratic values, encouraging respect for diversity and avoiding the portrayal of migration as a threat to social cohesion.

**Zooming in on the final trends in the definition of integration policies in Spain: the role of local authorities**

While the overall picture of municipal policy efforts in Spain is highly complex, most cities with migrant populations have defined, designed and implemented a set of integration and diversity instruments with which to plug the gaps left by an undeveloped or inexistent national integration framework. At the local level, the main work focus has been on reception, education, employment, civic citizenship and social participation. It is worth mentioning that, despite the economic crisis and its impact on local budgets, cities (and regions) have generally endeavoured to provide public services to local residents, thus contributing to the fostering of social cohesion. However, beyond public service provision and welcome policies to facilitate integration, local authorities now face new challenges.

Regarding civic participation, foreign nationals can only vote at the local level if they are EU residents or nationals from countries with which Spain has signed bilateral agreements. This limitation goes counter to the integration notion promoted by most local authorities – which promote equal access to rights, duties and opportunities for both nationals and foreigners. Aside from the right to vote, municipalities have engaged migrant populations in local politics by promoting forums or regional and local advisory committees. The active participation of the immigrant population in local neighbourhood associations and in schools (through parents’ associations), trade unions and professional associations as well as cultural, leisure and sports associations, is considered a priority. As a result, most social agents, immigrant associations and local governments tend to promote migrants’ engagement in the local community as a way to ensure a harmonious neighbourhood and inclusive citizenship beyond mere (and limited by law) political participation.

In recent years, the different municipalities have also developed anti-discrimination measures and awareness-raising actions to fight xenophobia. Several regional and local authorities have defined bodies or policies to combat racism and xenophobia, most of which involve information campaigns, advocacy, awareness-raising and training programmes for both public and private agents. In their role as cooperating organisations, NGOs also deploy actions in this area.

Recently, the refugee question has also been introduced onto local agendas. The war in Syria and the humanitarian crisis created by the influx of displaced people have had a tremendous impact on a Spanish society unaccustomed to refugee and asylum issues. Several cities have traditionally had reception services and actions for refugees but, since 2015, more Spanish cities have spoken of their willingness
to attend to and receive asylum-seekers and refugees. The asylum system in Spain is highly centralised and refugees’ care is provided by different national centres and several NGOs directly appointed for the purpose. Cities such as Barcelona and Madrid took the initiative to create a network of ‘safe cities’ to encourage people to assist refugees and asylum-seekers.\(^8\) Although, until today, the asylum system has remained unchanged and the role of cities dismissed despite their compromise and good will, the local authorities have become a clear voice asking for solidarity and respect for human rights for displaced people.

Finally, the appearance in 2019 of a new far-right party in Spain on several municipal councils could affect the development of integration measures in various regions and municipalities, although it is too early to evaluate its impact.

The multiplicity of actions developed at the local level complicates assessment of the role played by local authorities in terms of migrant integration, although its importance is unquestionable. Most cities with a foreign population have developed strategic plans for migrant integration, inclusion and citizenship, but the lack of shared indicators and evaluation grids disguises a general assessment of integration policies. In Spain, 20 municipalities are part of the RECI (Spanish Network of Intercultural Cities) which is related to the Intercultural Cities programme of the Council of Europe: through the ICC Index a limited assessment of these cities’ performance in terms of intercultural development could be undertaken. In spite of existing policy, academic and public debates on multiculturalism and interculturalism are recent in Spain and take place basically at the local level, with the leadership of Barcelona (Zapata-Barrero 2017).

Most cities have worked with a focus on citizenship, understanding it not as a question of national identity but of urban residence in a territory (Ferrero-Turrión and Pinyol-Jiménez 2009). Without being overconfident nor masking any current problems, this might explain why, with the considerable influx of migrants in a short period of time and without both a common approach to integration and enough resources, ‘living together’ in Spain has worked well enough.

**Final remarks**

Over a short period of time, Spain has had to confront new and different migration flows, to implement new responses and to look for new instruments and tools. During the earlier years of the twenty-first century, the main instruments were sketched out while, in recent years, integration has become the real challenge for Spanish society. Managing migration also implies the management of identities (Zapata-Barrero 2013) and, like other EU countries, Spain seeks to manage diversity and plurality without losing a common framework of identification and belonging.

The Spanish approach to integration was born in a specific and complex context: Spain is a country with its own cultural and regional diversity, of which migration has now become a part. Interestingly, as discussing internal diversity has been always a conflictual issue in Spanish politics, integration philosophies to deal with migration have been weaker than in other EU countries. The assimilation approach,
understood as a person abandoning her/his identity to adopt local norms and values, was present in most of the Spanish public instruments but in a weaker way, than, for instance, the French case. At the same time, as in the multiculturalism approach, the recognition of diversity is very much present in today’s Spain. This mixture of approaches has been seen via different instruments and public actions, most of them inspired by the intercultural approach at both national, regional and local levels. Note, however, that, despite the use of interculturalism as a public approach, public policies and instruments in Spain regarding integration could hardly be described as intercultural. Even now it seems evident that the existence of a philosophy (or philosophies) of integration in Spain is a debate located more in the academic sphere than in the political or social scenario (Ferrero-Turrión and Pinyol-Jiménez 2009).

Furthermore, in Spain, the lack of evidence-based data complicates assumptions about the impacts, outcomes and results of integration policies developed at all administration levels. Similarly, there are several areas in which integration topics should be redefined and multilevel governance better defined. The current set of bodies and instruments for the promotion of multilevel cooperation are far from working properly. As most integration policies are handled by regional governments and local authorities, the role of central government could be both to define a set of principles or guidelines which would promote and guarantee a homogeneous approach to integration in Spain, and to support other administrations in developing policies and instruments to fit it. The role of regional and local authorities should be strengthened, better coordinated and better funded. These administrations are key regarding integration policies, as they are designed to deal with the incorporation of a new and diverse citizenship in order not to simply avoid a negative impact in the maintenance of social cohesion and also to use their benefits and contributions to local development.

In Spain, the debates on migration, citizenship and national community are still open; however, they are indispensable to in-depth discussion. Talking about what kind of society the Spanish one is and will be will define the boundaries of the public philosophy of integration. Within this framework, the instruments, policies and actions required to manage plurality and diversity should be identified in order to guarantee social cohesion and peacefully living together in a decentralised Spain.

Finally, this chapter has provided some evidence that the Spanish case confirms the multilevel governance’s argument that migration policies at the admissions level and in the hands of central government, and integration policies under the decision-making of sub-state administration, are two arenas that mostly work independently and without structures ensuring cooperation and coordination. It is at this point that most of the tensions arise in Spain. The concrete case of local registration is just one illustration of the tensions between two policy narratives that often collapse and make explicit the fact that local claims for integration work better for decentralisation processes.

Notes


4 In the 1980s, the-then Catalan president coined the axiom: ‘Is Catalan everybody who lives and works in Catalonia and wants to be?’

5 See http://treballiaferssocials.gencat.cat/ca/ambits_tematics/immigracio/politiques_i_plans_dactuacio/antecedents/

6 As in most EU countries, issues regarding migration policies in terms of accession to the territory, border control, permits etc. are a national competence.


8 See, for instance, Barcelona’s initiative of Ciutat Refugi or City of Refuge (http://ciutatrefugi.barcelona/).

References


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